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I.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
The primary issue for determination is whether this action was timely filed by the Appellants
or, alternatively, whether the application of a two-year statute of limitations precluded the action
from going forward. Additionally, and per IAR 35(a)(5), the Appellants seek their attorneys'
fees on appeal believing that this matter is governed by I.e. § 12-120(3) inasmuch as the matter
involves a commercial transaction.

II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

The Nature ofthe Case.

This case was initiated by the Plaintiffs/Appellants, Justin S. Reynolds and Kristine
Reynolds and their construction company, Sunrise Development, LLC (hereinafter collectively
referenced as "Reynolds") against their former law firm and its attorney-employee Trout, Jones,
Gledhill, Fuhrman, P.A. and David T. Krueck (hereinafter collectively referenced as "Law
Firm") for negligence in the drafting of a real estate agreement for Reynolds and for continued
negligence in the dilatory prosecution oflitigation arising out ofthat real estate agreement.

B.

The Course of the Proceedings Below and Disposition.

The trial court granted a motion by the Defendants for summary judgment of dismissal on
the basis of its ruling that the two-year statute of limitations (I.C. § 5-219(4)) had run on the
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Reynolds' claim before the case was filed. The Court ruled from the bench and followed with an
Order for Dismissal. (R., p. 156)
On March 21, 2011, the Court entered fmal judgment against Reynolds. (R., p. 159)
Reynolds moved for reconsideration and an Amended Judgment was entered on May 18, 201l.
(R., p. 184) A Second Amended Judgment was then filed on May 27, 2011. (R., p. 187) A
Notice of Appeal was timely filed on June 27, 2011. CR., p. 190)
C.

Statement of the Facts.

In order to place the primary issue on appeal -- the time of commencement of the running

of the two year statute of limitations in this professional malpractice case -- in a meaningful
context, a timeline and overview of the key facts is in order.
July 21, 2006: A Purchase and Sale Agreement (R. 00075 - 91), drafted by Law Firm's
attorney David T. Krueck, was executed between Quasar Development, LLC as "Seller" and
Reynolds, as "Buyer" of a parcel of land which would accommodate the construction of 30
townhome lots. The sale price was $3,450,000. Reynolds deposited $60,000 as earnest money.
The sale completion was dependent upon Quasar platting the property by July 31, 2007
(Paragraph 7(a)). Id.
July 31, 2007: The platting of the property was not accomplished within the agreedupon time period, whereupon Reynolds terminated the Agreement and demanded return of the
earnest money. (R., p. 45) Quasar refused to return the earnest money, asserting that under the
terms of the Agreement $30,000 of the $60,000 earnest money was non-refundable.
September 25,2007: Law Firm then filed a Complaint in Ada County District Court (R
000052 - 57), Judge Darla Williamson, presiding, seeking the return of the full $60,000 from
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Quasar. The prayer asked for the return of the principal sum plus pre-judgment interest and
attorney's fees. (R 00056)

October 25, 2007: Quasar filed an Answer to the Complaint (R. 00058 - 62» denying
any liability under the Agreement above $30,000.

December 4, 2007: Reynolds then filed a motion for summary judgment. At the
hearing on that motion, Judge Williamson recited that Quasar's responsive brief on summary
judgment was to have been filed on December 21 st and that made Mr. Krueck's reply brief due
on December 28 th • (Affidavit of Justin Reynolds, p. 2) The reply brief was not filed until
February 8, 2008 - some six weeks late. Quasar moved to strike the reply brief and Judge
Williamson granted that motion as a sanction, stating:
"Therefore, as a sanction for failing to comply with the Court's order, the
Reply is stricken and will not be considered." (Appendix A to Affidavit of
Justin Reynolds) Id
The failure to file the reply brief on time and its being stricken and not considered
arguably had a substantial and material effect on the outcome.

Quasar, in its Answer to the

Complaint, made no reference to any defense of vagueness of the Agreement regarding the time
specified for a return of the earnest money other than denying that it had not timely performed.
(R., p. 00060)

However, Quasar argued in its response to the Reynolds' motion for summary

judgment that there was no time specified in the Agreement for return of the earnest money in
paragraph 7(a) which dealt with the deposit and return of the earnest money. Quasar argued
simply that it was entitled to a "reasonable time" within which to return the earnest money.
The issue was dealt with comprehensively in the reply brief which Law Firm attempted to
late-file. The late-filed brief (Appendix, pps. 9-11) provided compelling legal authority for the
proposition that where no time is specified, the time for performance must be interpreted as a
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 3

Reynolds petitioned to Alter or Amend the Judgment, and a second hearing was held on
April 25, 2011. Again, the Court ruled from the bench with no written opinion to follow.
At Reporter's Transcript page 10, lines 4 through 8, the Court admitted that it had erred
in the foundation of its initial ruling, stating:
"But I think - but, no, -- I think: to the extent that I erred in my earlier
ruling, the time is either as Ms. Points argues or as you argue. My
statement regarding the answer being the applicable date was not
correct." (Emphasis supplied)
At page 22, lines 5 through 11 the Court made the following statement:
"Well, I've gone back and looked at the whole thing from top to bottom
again for today. And I will start with the proposition that the Supreme
Court made the lives of the trial judges more difficult with the Buxton
case, McCall versus City of Buxton [verbatim] because of the language
they use in there."
The Court then concluded his ruling from the bench by asserting that the cause of action
arose when the Reynolds "incurred the damage" of having to pay their attorneys to enforce their
right to receive $60,000 rather than $30,000 return of earnest money.
An Amended Judgment was then entered on May 18, 2011 with a Second Amended

Judgment entered against the Reynolds on May 27, 2011 which included attorneys' fees awarded
to Law Firm.

III.
ARGUMENT
A.

Scope of Review

The Court exercises free review over issues decided by the trial

COlli4:

on a motion for

summary judgment. "This court's review of a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 6

judgment is the same standard used by the trial court in originally ruling on the motion."

Robison v. Bateman-Hall, 139 Idaho 207, 209, 76 P.3d 951, 953 (2003). The record is to be
liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and any
reasonable conclusions and inferences are drawn in that party's favor. Id.

Additionally, the

interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises de novo review. V-

I Oil Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 134 Idaho 716, 718, 9 P.3d 519,521 (2000).
B.

A Summary of the Argument

The Trial Court misconstrued this Court's decisions in City of McCall v. Buxton, 146
Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009) and other similar cases. The objective proof of Law Firm's
actionable negligence did not exist until, at the earliest, Judge Williamson's ruling on March 11,
2008. Since the malpractice action against Law Firm was filed within two years of that date, I.e.
§ 5-219(4) is not a bar to the action.
C.

Argument

1.

Buxton Overview

City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009) is a very comprehensive
and well-written analysis ofIdaho case law bearing on the issue of when the statute oflirnitations
governing professional negligence begins to run.
The Buxton analysis tracks the development of the applicable law. Normally, extensive
quotes from a case are disfavored but the following from Buxton takes one through a reasoning
process for the application of I.C. § 5-219(4) and this writer cannot hope to improve on the
Court's excellent and fundamental analysis.
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At 146 Idaho 659:
This Court has held that a cause of action for professional negligence
cannot accrue until some damage has occurred. Stephens v. Stearns, 106
Idaho 249, 254, 678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984). The reason for the "some
damage" rule is that "in order to recover under a theory of negligence, the
plaintiff must prove actual damage." Id. "Until some damage occurs, a
cause of action for professional malpractice does not accrue. Therefore,
some damage is required because it would be nonsensical to hold that a
cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations before that cause of
action even accrues." Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 586, 51 P.3d
396, 400 (2002) (Citations omitted). Obviously, the "some damage" that
has occurred must be damage that the client could recover from the
professional in an action for malpractice.
At 146 Idaho 659:
Potential harm or an increase in the risk of damage is not sufficient to
constitute some damage. For example, in Parsons Packing, Inc. v.
Masingill, 140 Idaho 480, 95 P.3d 631 (2004), the seller of about 15,000
onion bins had its attorney draft an installment sale contract to convey the
bins to a buyer. The attorney failed to file a UCC-l financing statement to
perfect his client's security interest in the property. The buyer made the
payments due on the contract for almost four and one-half years until after
it filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code.
The case was later converted to a proceeding under Chapter 7. Just less
than two years after the buyer filed bankruptcy, the seller brought an
action against his attorney to recover damages. The district court granted
the attorney summary judgment on the ground that the statute of
limitations began running when the onion bins were sold without adequate
security. This Court reversed, holding that although the seller was subject
to greater risk of nonpayment by not having a perfected security interest, it
did not suffer damage until the buyer filed bankruptcy. 140 Idaho at 483,
95 P.3d at 634. The attorney's negligence in failing to file the financing
statement in order to perfect his client's security interest created only the
potential for damage, which occurred when the buyer filed bankruptcy.
At 146 Idaho 660:
Likewise, in Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 808 P.2d 876 (1991),
landowners did not suffer damage when their attorneys failed to properly
file a release of a lis pendens regarding the landowners' development
property, thereby allowing the lis pendens to remain as a cloud on the title
to their property. They suffered damage about a year later when an
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investor withdrew his $300,000 offer to invest in the development because
of the existing lis pendens.
At 146 Idaho 660:
In Chicoine v. Bignal!, 122 Idaho 482, 487, 835 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1992),
this Court held that an "objectively ascertainable damage" rule previously
applied to a medical malpractice case also applied to all actions for
"professional malpractice." "[A]n action for professional malpractice shall
be deemed to have accrued for the purposes of I.C. § 5-219(4) only when
there is objective proof that would support the existence of some actual
damage." ld
At 146 Idaho 660:
In December 1989, Chicoine brought an action for malpractice against his
attorney. Even though he had incurred attorney fees in defending the
action after his attorney's negligent act in failing to timely request a new
trial, this Court held that "there was no objective proof of some actual
damage to Chicoine until this Court reversed the order granting a new trial
in O'Neill!." 122 IdallO at 487,835 P.2d at 1298.
At 146 Idaho 661:
These cases stand for the following. The statute of limitations for
professional malpractice does not begin to run until the plaintiff would
have a cause of action against the professional. Stephens v. Stearns, 106
Idaho 249, 254, 678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984). Because some damage is required
to have a cause of action for negligence, the cause of action cannot accrue
until there is some damage. ld. "[S]ome damage is required because it
would be nonsensical to hold that a cause of action is barred by the statute
of limitations before that cause of action even accrues." Lapham v.
Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 586, 51 P.3d 396, 400 (2002). Negligence that
increases the risk that a client will be harmed does not trigger the
running of the statute of limitations until harm actually occurs.
Parsons Packing, Inc. v. Masingill, 140 Idaho 480, 95 P.3d 631 (2004).
(Emphasis supplied.)
At 146 Idaho 661:
In addition, there must be objective proof that would support the existence
of some actual damage. Chicoine v. Bignal!, 122 Idaho 482, 487, 835 P.2d
1293, 1298 (1992). A client simply incurring attorney fees for the attorney
who negligently represents the client in particular litigation will not by
itself be objective proof which would support the existence of some
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 9

damage suffered by the client in that litigation. Fairway Development Co.
v. Peterson, Moss, Olsen, Meacham & Carr, 124 Idaho 866, 865 P.2d 957
(1993); Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482, 487, 835 P.2d 1293, 1298
(1992). Under the circumstances of these cases, objective proof did not
occur until there was a court decision adverse to the client because of
the attorney's negligence. (Emphasis supplied.)
2.

Beyond Buxton

In the context of the facts peculiar to this case, Buxton, in spite of its excellent teaching,
can be supplemented by additional precedent. "The determination of what constitutes 'damage'
for purposes of accrual of an action must be decided on the circumstances presented in each
individual case."

Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 543, 808 P.2d 876, 880 (1991).

Put

otherwise, there does not seem to be a "one size fits all" formula governing professional
negligence actions' accrual.
This creates a fork in the road. Do we automatically decide the issue of objective proof
of damage which is so dependent on the underlying facts on summary judgment motions (or
appellate decision) or do we allow, when a jury has been requested, the decision to be made by
the trier of fact?
"Circumstances" one might think is another word for "facts" or at least suggests a
constellation of facts. Alerriam-Webster, a standard authority for courts and Scrabble players
alike, provides this first definition: "1. a fact or event that must be considered along with another
fact or event." Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Home and Office Edition, 1998, p. 95.
Both sides below argued their version of the "circumstances" underlying the Reynolds'
cause of action. The arguments were cogent and forceful. As so often happens, though, neither
side saw things quite the same way. Law Firm argued for their "fact" of objective proof of
damage, i.e., when a demand for re-payment of the deposit was first made and rejected. The
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Reynolds responded that this fact was of no consequence and that Judge Williamson's decision
of March 11, 2008 was the event (fact) of accrual. Although questions of fact, to the extent that
they exist, are questions for a jury (if one is requested) the Trial Court nevertheless undertook to
decide which fact triggered the running of the limitations statute, I.e. § 5-219(4).
It is fundamental, however, that "All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor

of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to
be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." MacKay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho
408, 410, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066 (2008). Since a jury trial was requested R., p. 0008 and since
there is a genuine and material question of fact, the issue should have been for the jury, not for
the Trial Court. The decision of the Trial Court must be reversed and remanded for further
proceedings on this point alone.

3.

A Harder Look At The Law

The foregoing argument seems not to have been made before in this type of case.
Perhaps it is not an argument which will be accepted by this Court. If that is the case then we
should take a harder look at when there was "objectively ascertainable damage" or the "objective
proof' (both terms from Chicoine, supra) which triggered the running of the statute.
As stated above, this Court is now in a position where it utilizes free review. It applies
the same summary judgment standards under Rule 56 which are imposed on district courts by the
many decisions of record. A liberal review of the record is employed in favor of the non-moving
party. See, Jones v. Healthsouth Treasure Valley Hospital, 147 Idaho 109, 112,206 .3d 473, 476
(2009).
That liberal view will start with the recognition that there was a disagreement between
Reynolds and Quasar. Law Firm, in its representation of Reynolds seems to have dragged its
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 11

feet a little in bringing the dispute to a decision point. The Complaint filed by Law Firm against
Quasar was not filed until September 25, 2007. (R., p. 52) The Answer, for whatever reason,
was not filed until October 25, 2007. (R., p. 58) The Affidavit of Mrs. Reynolds in support of
the motion for summary judgment was not filed until December 4, 2007. (R., p. 63) At this
point in time the Reynolds were now fully five months from the date when Quasar needed to
either fulfill a condition precedent or refund the $60,000 earnest money. The final briefing on
the summary judgment motion was due on or before December 28, 2007, but was filed six weeks
late by Law Firm. While Reynolds may not have been entitled to an Olympic-class sprint from
their legal counsel, they did not appreciate or deserve a somewhat relaxed and tardy stroll
through a process which they expected would result in favor of their then-attorney's position that
a $60,000 refund was overdue?
Construing these facts liberally and in favor of the Reynolds, they had every right to
expect a good outcome. They similarly had every right to rely on their attorney's advice as
reflected in the Complaint filed on their behalf. But since there was a dispute they needed a
Court's decision. When that decision came on March 11,2008, the Court ruled that 50% of the
issues would be decided in the Reynolds' favor. The $60,000 - not $30,000 - was ruled the
amount due. However, the Court was not willing to be the trier of fact on the time element, i.e.,
when the $60,000 was due. While the Reynolds had some risk before the judge's ruling, they

continued to have risk after the ruling, albeit somewhat diminished. At that point, then, the
Reynolds still fit squarely within the Masingill holding that risk alone is not sufficient to trigger
the two-year statute oflimitations.

2 Law Firm, subject to Rule 11, I.R.C.P., had signed a pleading stating in no uncertain terms that the $60,000 should
have been paid upon demand and made a demand for pre-judgment interest as well as attorney's fees for its effort.
(R., p. 52)
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If the Trial Court had decided both issues as requested by Law Firm (principal, interest,
pre-judgment interest and attorney' s fees), Reynolds would have been made whole. In common
parlance, "no harm no foul." In legal terms: no possible damage. But they were left with
potential damage. 3
This case, because of its "circumstances," is very similar to the fact pattern of
Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 706 P.2d 63 (1985). In that case there was alleged a negligent
preparation of a tax return more than two years prior to the clients' awareness. The Supreme
Court held that the cause of action against the accountant accrued when the IRS assessed the
taxpayers for penalties and interest - not when the accounting negligence really occurred. The
court reasoned "Had the tax returns never been audited no loss would have been suffered and
plaintiffs-appellants would have had nothing to gain from filing suit." At 178.
Similarly, lvlaek Financial COlporation v. Smith, 111 Idaho 8, 720 P.2d 191 (1986)
reached the same conclusion following the same reasoning. The defendant accounting firm was
supposed to submit audits to a lender regarding the financial status of a purchaser of Mack trucks
on an installment plan. Audit reports were submitted for 1978, 1979 and 1980. There was a
second audit report relating to 1980 that was filed by the accountants on April 14, 1981. Just
four days later the borrower declared bankruptcy. The lender, Mack Financial, hired another
accounting firm which found errors in the defendant's audit report. Mack Financialleamed of
the errors in June of 1981. Mack Financial thought it could nevertheless recover the full amount
owed in bankruptcy court but in the spring of 1983 the bankruptcy court made Mack Financial
aware that it could not recover all of its claims from the bankruptcy trustee.

3

Potential damage is risk. It is not actual damage as to which there could have been "objective proof."
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Suit then

commenced on April 23, 1984, seemingly well outside of the two-year statute of limitations
provided by I.C. § 5-219(4).
Summary judgment was entered for the defendant accountant on these facts but was
reversed by this Court holding that it was not until the spring of 1983 when the bankruptcy court
resolved Mack Financial's claims against the borrower and "that it then became apparent that
Mack Financial would not be able to fully recompense from the bankrupt estate the amount
which it had loaned Shoemaker (the borrower)." At 11. The court continued in its analysis:
Thus the potential for 'nothing to gain by filing suit' Streib, supra, 109 Idaho at
178,706 P .2d at 67, existed up to the time when Mac Financial's claims were
finally resolved against it in the bankruptcy petition.

Id
In this case, when Reynolds learned that Quasar was arguing that Law Firm's Agreement
did not contain a specific time term for the repayment of the earnest money and that even the
amount of the earnest money to be returned was being contested, Reynolds had no loss. True,
the risk of loss was there in the same manner as the risk of damage in Parsons Packing, Inc. v.
Masingill, supra. But potential harm or an increase in the risk of damage is not sufficient to

constitute some damage. li1asingill, at 140 Idaho 483, 95 P.3d 634. \Vhen Law Firm filed suit
against Quasar, no damage had yet occurred. If Reynolds had sued Law Firm at that point in
time, it would have been pointless because there was no damage. As the case moved on and as
Judge Williamson ruled that the Defendant, Quasar, was wrong and that the entire $60,000 was
owed, Law Firm was only one step away from being vindicated. Law Firm was at that point in
time still in the same position as the accountants in Mack Financial or those who prepared the
tax returns in Streib. Had Judge Williamson ruled, for example, that thirty days was a reasonable
time within which the earnest money should have been returned and imposed the pre-judgment
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interest which had been prayed for in the Complaint - R 56 - then Law Firm would have
breathed a big sigh of relief as the possibility was that no cause of action would lie against it. 4
Unfortunately, Judge Williamson did not take that step. It is perhaps arguable that there
was objective proof of damage at that time. 5 But since Judge Williamson did not decide that
issue, one way or the other, it appears that there was still no damage until and unless there was a
judgment against Reynolds on the time term or unless Reynolds was not made whole. As the
case progressed, the jury still could have made Reynolds whole by finding that the time had long
since passed for the refund of the earnest money. The following judgment could have then
allowed for both pre- and post-judgment interest, costs, and attorney's fees.
Instead of proceeding to trial, however, the case was settled subsequent to Judge
Williamson's decision. (R., p. 67) With that, Law Firm nearly dodged a bullet again. One
might have been able to argue that the Reynolds were still not made whole at that point in time
because of some slight deficiency in interest and/or attorney's fees. But one does not need to
make that argument since the suit here was filed timely and Quasar filed for bankruptcy
subsequent to the Stipulated Judgment with no assets for the Reynolds or anyone else.
Regardless, the argument made by Law Firm's attorneys below that the damage occurred
the instant that Quasar refused to pay back the earnest money is not supported by the string of
cases decided by this Court.
The Statement of Facts which appears above controls the outcome of this case. Each fact
must be observed, considered and weighed because the case law reflecting interpretation of I.e.

4

Assuming that the delay occasioned by the poor drafting did not cause the Judgment to be uncollectable.

5

Tn which case this action was timely tiled.
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§ 5-219(4) is reasonably well-settled. This is certainly borne out by this Court's holding in
Chicoine, supra, which is amply and favorably cited in Buxton.

The Court will recall that the Chicoine defendants were accused of alienation of affection
and invasion of privacy for a distraught husband and his children. The jury trial resulted in a
judgment against Chicoine and other defendants. A Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict was granted by the trial court and it was reversed in part on appeal. The case was
returned to the district court to straighten out damages awarded to the husband with an additional
part of the decision abrogating the cause of action pleaded as alienation of affection.
However, as an afterthought and before the appeal went up, the attorney representing
Chicoine had moved for a new trial. When the case was returned to the trial court that motion
was heard and the trial court granted a new trial. That caused a second appeal to be filed sub
nom O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 116 Idaho 507, 777 P.2d 729(1989). The Supreme Court noted then

that the trial court had no jurisdiction because the motion for a new trial had not been timely filed
back in 1983. The decision of the Supreme Court was rendered on July 11, 1989 -just about six
years after the initial judgment. In December of that year, Chicoine brought suit against his
attorney.

The Supreme Court held that the suit was timely because the objective proof of

damage did not occur until July 11, 1989 - the date of its latest decision. "So long as the trial
court's order stood, Chicoine was entitled to a new trial despite the untimeliness of the motion."
At 122 Idaho 487, 835 P.2d at 1298.
Had Law Firm been a better and more careful drafter of a garden-variety purchase and
sale agreement, it is at least arguable that the earnest money would have been paid in the midsummer of 2007. Quasar was solvent then and a recorded Judgment probably would have been
paid. (Affidavits of Justin Reynolds and Yolanda Hays; Stipulated Motion to Augment Record)
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 16

As events unfolded, there was finally a Stipulated Judgment against Quasar entered on
September 10, 2008, some fourteen months after Quasar's default. If that Judgment had been
collected, Law Firm would arguably again be in the clear. Again, "no harm no foul." But it was
uncollectable. Id. 6
Whenever there was objective proof of damage - at the time of Judge Williamson's
decision or later in time - the earliest that objective proof of damage was present was less than
two years from the filing of the present action. The Trial Court simply erred. This Court's prior
decisions support that conclusion.

IV.

ATTORNEYS FEES
Reynolds are entitled to an award of attorney fees on this appeal based upon the
attorney/client relationship being a "commercial transaction" within the purview ofIdaho Code §
12-120(3). District Judge Michael McLaughlin's decision in City of McCall v. Buxton, et al.,

supra, (R 141) held that a contract for attorney services was a commercial transaction and that
the fact that the contract was for attorney services, not any other service, does not change the
nature of the transaction into one for either personal services or household services. Judge
McLaughlin relied on Binka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 592 (2007).

Buxton, as decided on appeal, is in accord.

6 The Court can take judicial notice that the fall of2008 was not a good time to be in the Idaho real estate
development business.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 17

v.
CONCLUSION

Reynolds request that the Court rule that the Complaint in this action was timely filed,
that the Second Amended Judgment and all prior Judgments be vacated, and that the case be
remanded to the district court for further proceedings, in addition to an award of attorney fees
and costs to the Reynolds on this appeal.
1ft
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this ) ;.;- day of October, 2011.

LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD.

{[l!L·

By
Donald W. Lojek
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Sunrise Development, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
SUNRISE DEVELOPMENT, LLC., an Idaho
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

v.
QUASAR DEVELOPMENT, LLC, and Idaho
limited liability company,
Defendants.

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0717098

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

-----------------------------)
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, by and through its counsel of record, and hereby
respectfully submits this Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintitrs Motion for
Summary Judgment.

I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Defendant attempts to dispute the Plaintiffs description of the facts of this
case, but rather than set forth the actual facts underlying the transaction between the
parties, the Defendant chooses to mischaracterize the terms of the Agreement at issue.
The Defendant fails to provide this Court with the definition of "Earnest Money,"
as that term is described in Section 2(a) of the Agreement. The Plaintiff alleges in both

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- I

,

'

its briefing and in the Affidavit of Kristine Reynolds in Support of PlaintifFs Motion for

Summary Judgment that the Earnest Money is comprised of three separate deposits as
defined by the express terms of the parties' contract, two of which are described as nonrefundable. What the Defendant chooses to ignore is the fact that all three deposits,
including the Initial Deposit and Additional Deposit, are collectively defined as the
"Earnest Money" paid by the Plaintiff.

Section 2(a) of the Agreement provides in

pertinent part: "[t]he Initial Deposit, the Additional Deposit, and the Approval Deposit
may be collectively referred to herein as the "Earnest Money." (Emphasis in original).
See, Affidavit of Kristine Reynolds in Support of PlaintifFs Motion for Summary

Judgment, Exhibit' A,' p. 2.
While the definition of the term "Earnest Money" in Section 2(a) of the
Agreement is an inconvenient fact for the Defendant in this case, the Court should not be
misled by the Defendant's attempt to focus attention on the references to non-refundable
deposits made by the Plaintiff. The Earnest Money paid by the Plaintiff in three separate
installments is the sum of all three deposits (totaling $60,000.00), not just the Approval
Deposit of $30,000.00. A plain reading of Section 2(a) of the Agreement supports the
Plaintiff's description of the facts underlying the parties' transaction.
The Defendant then attempts to mislead this Court by alleging and arguing that
the Plaintiff is only entitled to "request" a refund of the "refundable earnest money
deposits" under the terms of Section 7(a) of the Agreement. See, Affidavit of Amanda

Alvaro in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

~

7; Defendant'S

Response Memorandum to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3

~

3. Section

7(a) of the Agreement provides in pertinent part: "[i]n the event Seller (Defendant) fails
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to record the final plat of the Subdivision with the Ada County Recorder's Office by July
31, 2007, Buyer (Plaintiff) may, at its sole discretion, terminate this Agreement upon
written notice to Seller (Defendant), and Buyer (Plaintiff) may then obtain a full refund
of the Earnest Money without any further obligations under the terms of this Agreement."
See, Affidavit of Kristine Reynolds in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment, Exhibit 'A,' p. 6. Section 7(a) makes no reference whatsoever to "refundable
earnest money deposits," as alleged by Ms. Alvaro and presented to this Court as a
disputed fact. Section 7( a) states that the Plaintiff has the right to obtain, not request, a
full refund of the Earnest Money. Again, the term "Earnest Money" is defined in Section
2(a) as the sum of all three deposits paid by the Plaintiff totaling $60,000.00.
The Plaintiff has provided this Court with a true and correct copy of the
Agreement. The Plaintiffs description of the undisputed facts in this case contains the
actual terms utilized by the parties in their Agreement and the fact that the Plaintiff
demanded a full return of the Earnest Money after the time expired for the recordation of
the final plat for the Subdivision.

II.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Court should not consider Paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Affidavit of
Amanda Alvaro in ruling upon the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), when evidence presented in

opposition to a motion for summary judgment is challenged as being inadmissible, the
trial court must determine the admissibility of the evidence before ruling on the motion.

Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42,844 P.2d 24 (Ct. App. 1992).
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Idaho statutes and case law provide that an affidavit containing the following
infirmities may not be considered by the Court when evaluating the merits of a motion
for summary judgment:
1.

A Court should not consider extrinsic evidence regarding the meaning
of a contract provision if the agreement is unambiguous.

In Tolley v. THI Company, 140 Idaho 253, 92 P.2d 503 (2004), the Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed a district court's holding that, "where a contract is clear and
unambiguous, the determination and effect of a contractual provision is a question of law
to be decided by the court." !d,. at 260-61. In affirming this long held principle, the
Supreme Court held, "The Agreement is unambiguous.

It cannot be changed or

interpreted by reference to matters outside the text." Id. (emphasis added).
The Tolley decision is entirely in accord with prior decisions from Idaho Courts
on this subject. See, Latham v. Gardner, 105 Idaho 854, 673 P.2d 1048 (1983) ("The
legal effect of an unambiguous written document must be decided by the trial court as a
question oflaw." Id,. at 857.); Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 11 P.3d 20 (2000) (If the
language of the contract is plain and unambiguous, the intention of the parties must be
determined from the contract itself. !d., at 827); and City of Idaho Falls v. Home Indem.
Co., 126 Idaho 604, 888 P.2d 383 (1995) (If a contract is unambiguous, the determination

of the contract's meaning and legal effect is a question of law, and the meaning of the
contract and intent of the parties must be determined from the plain meaning of the
contract's own words. Id., at 607).
Paragraphs 13 and 14 of Ms. Alvaro's Affidavit introduce extrinsic evidence
regarding the real estate market in the Treasure Valley and other "land sale agreements."
These allegations are inadmissible in this case and should not be considered by the Court.
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The real estate market and Quasar's "cash flow problems" have no bearing on the
Plaintiffs claims that the Defendant breached the parties' Agreement. The Defendant
has not, and cannot, argue that the terms at issue are ambiguous. Consequently, the Court
should not consider these allegations by Ms. Alvaro in determining whether the Plaintiff
is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
2.

Statements which speculate as to the intentions of third parties and
statements concerning transactions in which the affiant either did not
participate or has not laid a proper foundation to establish his
participation are inadmissible.

In Hecla Mining Company v. Star-Morning Mining Company, 122 Idaho 778,
786-87 (1992), the Supreme Court held that statements in the affidavit of a lessee's
operations manager regarding, inter alia, representations, communications, and
understanding between parties, were conclusory and did not provide the kind of specific,
admissible facts that would either support or prevent entry of summary judgment and,
thus, the trial court was not required to consider such statements in ruling on lessors'
motion for summary judgment. In Posey v. Ford Motor Credit Company, 141 Idaho 477
(2005), the Court of Appeals held that the trial court was required to strike portions of a
credit company lessor's employee's summary judgment affidavit that pertained to an
alleged internet communication between the lessee and the lessor and a letter from the
lessor to the lessee, in a breach of contract case arising out of a dispute over a truck lease,
where the employee's affidavit did not show any participation in the transaction at issue,
or that the employee witnessed any of the events in the case, or that the employee
communicated with the

lessee at any time.

In State v. Shama Resources Limited

Partnership, 127 Idaho 267 (I 995), the Supreme Court struck affidavits which contained

"generalizations about all of the offerees and investors in Shama and declarations about
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 5

information supposedly known by the Shama offerees and investors without statements
by those individuals."
Paragraph 14 of Ms. Alvaro's Affidavit describes other transactions which are not
properly before this Court. Ms. Alvaro fails to lay any foundation whatsoever as to why
any of these undefined transactions have any bearing on the issue before this Court,
which relates strictly to the Agreement and the Plaintiff s breach of contract claims
relating to the Agreement.

3.

Legal conclusions which invade the province of the fact fmder cannot
be considered.

Under the Idaho Rules of Evidence, a properly qualified expert may be pennitted
to render an opinion, otherwise admissible, which embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact. LR.E. 704. However, LR.E. 704 must be read in light of
LR.E. 702. Fowler v. Kootenai County, 128 Idaho 740 (1996); State v. Walters, 120
Idaho 46 (1991). "Rule 704 has not opened the door to all opinions on every subject. .. ".

Id. at 55. Thus, a qualified expert may only give testimony in the form of an opinion or
otherwise on evidence which is "beyond the common experiences of most jurors" and
will assist them in understanding the evidence or in detennining a fact in issue. LR.E.

702; Fowler v. Kootenai County, 128 Idaho 740 (1996); State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688,
694 (1988). Expert opinion testimony is admissible up to, but excluding the point at
which the expert weighs the evidence, in essence evaluating the circumstances and
rendering the same conclusion which the jury is asked to render by its verdict. Id. When
"----ilie-ex-pert-is,-in-eif-ect,ask--ed4e-weigh-the--evidencebefere-the-juf)',-the-epinien·testimony
impennissibly transcends the "test of jury enlightenment and enter[s] the realm of factfinding." Id.
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Paragraph 14 of Ms. Alvaro's Affidavit appears to be a half-hearted attempt to
provide this Court with a legal conclusion regarding the time for performance under the
terms of the parties' Agreement. As such, this Paragraph should not be considered
because it invades the province of the finder of fact.

B.

The Plaintiff is entitled to a full refund of the Earnest Money as a matter of
law.

The Defendant has chosen to utterly disregard the express terms contained in the
parties' Agreement. The Agreement does not state that the Plaintiff is only entitled to
request a "refund of the refundable earnest money deposits" as argued by the Defendant.
To the contrary, the Agreement defines the term "Eamest Money" to include all three
payments made by the Plaintiff totaling $60,000.00.
received all three deposits paid by the

PI~intiff.

The Defendant admits that it

See, Affidavit of Amanda Alvaro in

Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment" 3 and 5.

The Defendant fails to address, or even acknowledge for that matter, the basic
terms and definitions set forth in Sections 2 and 7 of the Agreement. "Eamest Money" is
a defined term. The parties agreed that if the final plat was not recorded with the Ada
County Recorder's Office by July 31, 2007, the Plaintiff has the right to terminate the
Agreement and "obtain a full refund of the Earnest Money." The Agreement does not
allow the Defendant to retain $30,000.00 if the plat was not recorded by the date agreed
to by the parties. The Court can rule as a matter of law in favor of the Plaintiff without
any further analysis. With that said, the reason the Plaintiff reserved the right to obtain a
full refund of all of the money it paid to the Defendant if this condition was not fulfilled
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is obvious - the Defendant should not receive a windfall in the event it failed to record
the final plat for the Subdivision a full year after the parties executed the Agreement.
The Defendant does not argue that the definitions and terms contained in the
Agreement are ambiguous. The Defendant has instead chosen to insert terms into the
parties Agreement that are nowhere to be found.

The Defendant's entire argument

disputing the amount it is required to refund the Plaintiff is premised on its false assertion
that Section 7(a) only provides the Plaintiff the right to "request" a refund of the
"refundable earnest money deposits." The Defendant boldly makes this argument by
actually underlining the term "refundable" in both the Affidavit ofAmanda Alvaro and its
briefing to this Court. The parties, however, never agreed to this provision. The phrase
"refundable earnest money deposits" is nowhere to be found in Section 7(a) of the
Agreement.
The Defendant simply does not have the right to keep any portion of the Earnest
Money. The references to non-refundable deposits in Section 2(a) are irrelevant if the
condition precedent in Section 7(a) was not fulfilled.

Section 2(a) plainly and

unambiguously defines the term "Earnest Money" as all three deposits paid by the
Plaintiff - the "Initial Deposit," the "Additional Deposit" and the "Approval Deposit"
- without regard to whether the deposits were refundable or non-refundable. Section 7(a)
refers to a full refund of the "Earnest Money" without distinguishing the three deposits
which comprise the Earnest Money. Had the Plaintiff chosen to terminate the Agreement
for some reason other than the failure to fulfill the condition precedent described and
contained in Section 7(a) of the Agreement, perhaps the Defendant's distinction would
have merit.
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The Defendant's argument that it is only responsible for refunding $30,000.00 of
the Earnest money paid to it by the Plaintiff is without merit and runs counter to the terms
of the parties' Agreement. The Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law against
the Defendant for the full $60,000.00 it paid. The Plaintiff submits that a plain reading of
Sections 2(a} and 7(a} of the Agreement is all that is required by this Court to make a
determination of the parties' legal rights and duties. The Defendant's attempt to insert
terms which are not part of the parties' contract should be disregarded.

C.

The Plaintiff is entitled to an immediate refund of the Earnest Money as a
matter of law.

The Defendant apparently believes that it is not required to perform its contractual
duty to refund the Earnest Money to the Plaintiff until the Defendant's "cash flow
problems" are resolved. This defense is incredible and is not supported by the law or the
facts of this case.
Where no time for performance is established by the parties' agreement, the law
will implies that performance must occur within a reasonable time. McFarland v. Join

School District No. 365 in Elmore and Owyhee Counties, 108 Idaho 519, 700 P.2d 141
(Ct. App. 1985). A different rule, however, applies to the parties' contract where time is
deemed, expressly or implicitly, to be "of the essence." Udjur v. Thompson, 126 Idaho 6,
878 P.2d 180 (et. App. 1994).
The Defendant correctly asserts that Section 7(a} does not specify a date for the
Defendant
to perform its duty to refund the Earnest Money. The parties did, however,
,
agree that time is of the essence "for the performance of any act" required by the
Agreement.

See, Affidavit of Kristine Reynolds in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
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Summary Judgment, Exhibit 'A,' Section 15(1), p. 13. This provision must be interpreted

as a matter of law to require the Defendant to promptly perform its duty to refund the full
Earnest Money to the Plaintiff.
When Ms. Alvaro signed her affidavit, almost five (5) full months had expired
from the time the Plaintiff exercised its contractual right to terminate the Agreement and
obtain a full refund of the Earnest Money. By the time the Court hears oral argument on
the Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, nearly seven (7) months will have passed
since the time the Plaintiff sent written notice to the Defendant and its legal counsel
seeking a refund of the Earnest Money. If the Court denies the Plaintiffs motion and this
case goes to trial as scheduled, nearly fifteen (15) months will have expired from the date
the Plaintiff sent its notice to the Defendant to the time of trial.
The Defendant would like to empanel a jury to determine the sole issue of when
the Defendant is legally responsible to refund money paid to it by the Plaintiff. The fact
that the Defendant is being asked to refund money paid to it should not be ignored. The
Plaintiff is not seeking payment from the Defendant, but rather a refund of the
$60,000.00 already paid by the Plaintiff. The Defendant would have this Court believe
that the Plaintiffs right to receive a refund of the Earnest Money is contingent upon real
estate market conditions.

Ms. Alvaro does not even offer an estimate of when the

Defendant intends to actually perform its contractual duty to refund the Earnest Money to
the Plaintiff or what the Defendant contends a "reasonable" time to perform actually is,
regardless of the amount owed to the Plaintiff. I Instead, she makes a vague allegation to
other "land sale agreements in the Treasure Valley."

1 Ms. Alvaro admits that the Defendant owes at least $30,000.00 to the Plaintiff, but makes no allegation
as to when the Defendant is actually responsible for paying those funds to the Plaintiff.
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Whether parties to other transactions choose to "set timefi"ames for performance
in months or years in the future" is of no consequence or effect in the case at bar. All that
this Court should consider is what the Plaintiff and the Defendant agreed to in Agreement
that is the subject matter of this lawsuit. This case does not involve ambiguous or vague
terms that require the Court to consider extrinsic evidence or industry standards. The
Court can, and should, enforce the terms of the parties' Agreement, which requires both
the Plaintiff and the Defendant to perform any act in a prompt and timely fashion. The
Defendant has failed to fulfill this contractual duty as a matter of law by refusing to
timely refund the full Eamest Money and withholding payment indefinitely.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court
grant Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and declare that the Defendant has
breached the Agreement and is required to refund Plaintiffs Earnest Money as a matter
of law.
DATED this 6 th day of February, 2008.
TROUT. JONES. GLEDHILL. FUHRMAN,

By:
eck, Of the Firm
for Plaintiff
Sunrise Development, LLC
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Michael T. Spink
Richard H. Andrus
SPINK BUTLER, LLP
251 E Front St., Ste. 200
PO BOX 639
Boise, ID 83701
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